THE EMERGING ARMY IN AZERBAIJAN
by Patrick Gorman*
Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1993
[Bibliography - Bottom of page]
Before the collapse of the USSR in December
1991, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was waged primarily by lightly-armed
irregular forces from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The withdrawal of Russian and
CIS forces resulted in the transfer of vast stores of modern military equipment
to the Azerbaijanis during the summer of 1992 and helped to escalate the level
of violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to new heights. Moreover, the
abandonment of vital air defense facilities within Azerbaijan and the removal
of CIS border guards from the Azeri-Iranian border has greatly complicated the
defense responsibilities of Azerbaijan. Paradoxically, the removal of CIS
forces and the transfer of military hardware to Armenia and Azerbaijan, while
initially intensifying the level of conflict, has had the effect of tempering
passions and pushing both sides towards a negotiated settlement.
Despite the fact that the Azerbaijanis suffered grievously at the hands of
Soviet troops during the January 1990 communal conflict in Baku, the
Communist-dominated government of Azerbaijan continued to support the presence
of Soviet troops in their country; moreover, the fulfillment of republic draft
quotas, though not completely satisfied, remained a relatively high 84 percent
during the spring 1991 call-up. (By contrast, Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan's
Transcaucasus neighbors, registered 16.5 and 8.1 percent, respectively).[1] While Armenia and Georgia had created formal
defense establishments prior to the August 1991 coup attempt, the
Azerbaijani
leadership waited until September 1991, when it was under considerable popular
pressure in the face of upcoming elections, before establishing a Ministry of
Defense. Prior to the creation of an independent defense establishment, the
bulk of the fighting for Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh was conducted by OMON
(Special Purpose Militia) units from the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD) and irregular forces aligned with the Azerbaijani Popular Front
(APF), the prominent government opposition group. The imminent collapse and
dissolution of the Soviet Union introduced a new dynamic into the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as increasingly emboldened Azerbaijani government
officials declared their intention to seize the sizable stores of military
hardware located on Azerbaijani soil. As a consequence, the intervening year
has witnessed the conflict change from one waged between small groups of
lightly armed combatants to one conducted with tanks, multiple-rocket
launchers, and modern attack aircraft.
BACKGROUND
Under the military structure of the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan was host to
over 60,000 Soviet military personnel deployed throughout the country in units
of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Navy. The primary
combat formation of Ground Forces in Azerbaijan was the Soviet Fourth Army,
which housed its headquarters and various support units in Baku. In addition
to the independent surface-to-air (SAM) missile, artillery, and SCUD brigades,
the principal combat elements of the Fourth Army were the 23rd (Gianja), 295th
(Lenkoran'), 60th (Baku), 75th (Nakhichivan) Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD),
and the Gianja Helicopter Assault Regiment (Mi-24 Hinds and Mi-8 Hips).[2] The only ground forces training establishment
in Azerbaijan was the Combined Arms Command School at Baku. Under the
reporting provisions of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty, it was
declared that 391 tanks, 1,265 armored combat vehicles, 463 artillery pieces
(100 millimeter or more), and 24 helicopters were located in Azerbaijan in
February 1991.[3] If these divisions were
category I divisions (i.e., 100 percent manned at wartime strength),
then the total number of ground forces personnel in Azerbaijan would include
over 10,000 officers and warrant officers and nearly 40,000 enlisted.
Likewise, fully manned divisions would include over 1,100 tanks and 1,500
armored combat vehicles. It is clear from these figures that most of these
divisions were either category II (70-80 percent manned) or category III (20-50
percent manned) divisions. In fact, the 75th MRD, dispersed along the
Soviet-Iranian border in Nakhichivan, was maintained at a category IV level
(5-10 percent manned).[4] Only the 23rd MRD,
deployed along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border since March 1990, seems to have
been at a category II level or higher. In late 1991, total Soviet ground
forces personnel in Azerbaijan numbered between forty to forty-five thousand
men.
Soviet naval forces located within Azerbaijan included the headquarters of the
Caspian Sea Flotilla, the Caspian Higher Naval School, and the 23rd Military
Ship Repair Yard. While naval bases of the Caspian Sea Flotilla were located
in Russia (Astrakhan), Kazakhstan (Guryev) and Turkmenistan (Krasnovodsk), the
bases at Baku were considered the best developed and most important. In 1991
the Caspian Sea Flotilla consisted of 4 Riga-class frigates, 30 patrol and
coastal combatants, 22 minesweepers, 19 Polnocny-class amphibious landing
ships, and 10 support craft. Total personnel in the Caspian Sea Fleet
approached 4,000 officers and enlisted, with the majority of these forces
stationed at Baku.[5]
In addition to the regular forces of the Transcaucasus Military District,
Azerbaijan was the home of the 6,500-strong 104th Airborne Division at Gianja
(formerly Kirovabad), two battalions of the KGB Border Guards, and the
so-called "Don" Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which
maintained 3,600 troops along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and 5,500 men
within Nagorno-Karabakh during 1991.[6]
As part of the 34th Air Army of the Transcaucasus Military District, Azerbaijan
hosted three Soviet Air Force regiments: a ground attack regiment (30
Su-25/Frogfoot) at Sital-Chay; a reconnaissance regiment (30 Su-24/Fencer and
Mig-25/Foxbat) at Dallyar; and a bomber (30 Su-24/Fencer) at either Kiudamir or
Kazi Magomed Air Bases.[7] Including ground
combat support personnel, it is likely that the total number of Soviet Air
Force personnel in Azerbaijan was around 2,000 men.
Within the unified air defense system of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, along
with most of the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus regions, was protected by the
Tbilisi Air Defense Army. The radar troops, surface-to-air missile (SAM)
brigades, and aviation regiments in the Azerbaijani zone provided valuable air
defense early-warning and protection capability along the volatile
Soviet-Iranian border and the southern Caspian Sea region. To this end,
Azerbaijan was equipped with a series of early warning radars and SAMs, and
one aviation regiment of Mig-29 fighter aircraft at Nasosnyj Air Base northwest
of Baku.[8] Perhaps more importantly, however,
is the fact that Azerbaijan hosted the Gabelinskiy missile-attack,
early-warning, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar station at Liaki. The OTH radar
site at Liaki was one of eight multi-billion dollar radar stations designed to
identify and track ballistic missiles along the peripheries of the former USSR.
The Liaki radar station, which entered service in the late 1980s, provided
critical OTH radar coverage over most of the Middle East, giving the Soviets
vital early-warning coverage in a region of increasing ballistic missile
capability.[9]
THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT AZERBAIJANI MILITARY
Unlike its neighboring republics in the Transcaucasus, Azerbaijan was slow to
create an independent Ministry of Defense before the August 1991 coup in
Moscow. In fact, Azerbaijani leaders encouraged draft-aged men within the
republic to respond to the draft call-ups, serve in the Soviet Army, and
receive valuable military training. This encouragement, coupled with a
relaxation in 1990 of the Soviet policy of stationing servicemen outside of
their native republics, guaranteed a relatively high fulfillment of the
Azerbaijani draft quota requirement in the 1991 spring and fall call-ups. The
immediate impact of these two events was a dramatic increase in the percentage
of Azerbaijani nationals serving in the Fourth Army from the years 1990 to
1992.[10]
In the absence of a republic-controlled defense establishment, the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh was conducted by Azerbaijani irregulars and units from the
Azerbaijani MVD OMON forces. As was the case in OMON units in other republics
of the Soviet Union, the OMON detachments in Azerbaijan were often manned by
former soldiers of the Soviet Army and veterans of the war in Afghanistan.[11] However, as the Soviet Fourth Army became
increasingly "nativized" by Azerbaijanis throughout 1991, units subordinate to
the Fourth Army began taking a more partisan approach towards the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Operation "Ring," an offensive initiated during the summer
of 1991 with the intention of disarming and deporting Armenian fighters within
Nagorno-Karabakh, was conducted by elements of the predominantly-Azerbaijanized
23rd MRD, Azerbaijani MVD OMON forces, and Soviet MVD troops. The operation
continued until August 1991, when the failed coup in Moscow brought about new
leadership in the Soviet military and Internal Affairs Ministry.[12]
In the wake of the failed coup, President Mutalibov, acting under pressure in
the approaching election to establish his bona fides as a
Communist-turned-nationalist, established the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense
on 10 September 1991. General-Lieutenant Barshatli Valeg Eiub-olgi, a sixty
four-year old former airborne troop artillery officer and tank commander, was
named Minister of Defense. The Azerbaijani government immediately declared its
intention to inventory all former-Soviet units and equipment on its territory
and increased the pressure on Moscow to release more military equipment from
the Fourth Army to the Azeri side. The Azerbaijani MOD announced its plans to
create a 20,000-strong national army consisting of ground, air, and naval
forces. The foundation of the ground forces was to be several mechanized
brigades, each consisting of 2,000 to 3,000 men and organized according to a
standard brigade-battalion-company structure. The air forces were to consist
of three regiments: one fighter aircraft regiment, a helicopter assault
regiment, and an air transport regiment.[13]
President Mutalibov was forced from office on March 6 following serious Azeri
defeats in Nagorno-Karabakh and reports that scores of Azerbaijani civilians
were massacred by Armenian forces in the village of Khojaly in late February
1992. Azerbaijan's military position in Nagorno-Karabakh continued to be
seriously undermined during the internecine political struggles between
Mutalibov, his supporters, and members of the APF throughout March and April.
Mutalibov's short-lived return to power on May 14th to 15th followed the
Armenian capture of several Azeri strongholds in Nagorno-Karabakh and the
opening of the Lachin-Shusha corridor from Armenia to Azerbaijan. Armenian
forces then turned south and launched an offensive into the isolated
Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichivan, where Gejdar Aliev, the former Communist
Party boss of Azerbaijan and current speaker of Nakhichivan's parliament, had
enjoyed months of de facto autonomy from republican authorities in Baku.
The Azeri position began to stabilize, however, following the appointment of
Rakhim Gaziyev as Defense Minister, the CIS meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan --
at which the assets of the former Red Army were divided among the former-Soviet
republics -- and the election of APF leader Abdulfaz Elchibej on June 7.
Following the June elections, Azeri forces mounted an effective campaign
against Armenian forces, recapturing dozens of Armenian-held villages within
Nagorno-Karabakh. The seesaw attacks continued throughout the summer with
Azeri armored forces and attack aircraft making advances in Nagorno-Karabakh
and along the Azeri-Armenian border only to be countered by effective Armenian
artillery and Russian-supplied SA-16 surface-to-air missiles.
RETREAT OF THE COMMONWEALTH FORCES
The MVD regiment in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was withdrawn during
November and December 1991 in conjunction with the reorganization of the MVD
and KGB. The complete dissolution of the Soviet Union in December witnessed an
increased willingness on the part of Azerbaijanis to attack CIS military units
located within Azerbaijan in order to confiscate weapons and military equipment
for use in Nagorno-Karabakh. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that in
most units, the bulk of the officer corps was Slavic (primarily Russian) while
the majority of the enlisted personnel were Azerbaijani nationals. Caught
between Azerbaijani government decrees nationalizing all military equipment, on
one hand, and rebellious Azerbaijani soldiers agitating for military action
against the Armenians, on the other, the Russian officers organized themselves
and appealed directly to Moscow for assistance. During an all-Army conference
set in Moscow in January, Colonel-General Patrikeyev, the commander of the
Transcaucasus Military District, argued that the beleaguered military district
should be placed directly under the control of the Russian Federation.[14] The difficult situation was publicly
highlighted by the disastrous retreat of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment.
Azerbaijani officials accused this regiment of participating in the Khojali
massacre, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the unit from
Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to poor coordination and under siege from local Armenian
residents who did not wish to see the 366th and its military hardware leave,
the remaining men and equipment of the demoralized regiment had to be brought
out by Russian Spetsnaz and airborne troops in early March 1992.[15] The retreat of the 366th coincided with
attacks by Azeri nationals on other sub-units of the Fourth Army and the
disarming of several PVO radar sites along the Azeri-Iranian border. In light
of these incidents and under pressure from his military advisors, President
Yeltsin transferred both the Transcaucasus Military District and the Caspian
Sea Flotilla to Russian jurisdiction on March 25, and in April sent Andrej
Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, to the Transcaucasus to iron out the
problems associated with this transfer.[16]
The issue concerning the division of military assets belonging to the former
Soviet Union was the primary topic of the May 15 meeting of CIS leaders in
Tashkent. In accordance with the Tashkent agreement, the weapons and equipment
in Azerbaijan from the 23rd and 295th MRD, which included 150 tanks, 290
infantry fighting vehicles, 150 mortars, and 90 anti-aircraft guns, were turned
over to Azerbaijani authorities in early June 1992. Disregarding the proposed
timetable proposed by the Tashkent agreement which called for the orderly
transfer and removal of remaining CIS/Russian equipment and personnel,
Azerbaijani forces moved quickly and seized military airfields and aircraft at
Dallyar Air Base, where Azeri troops captured 5 Mig-25, 11 Su-24 reconnaissance
aircraft and 3 IL-76 transport aircraft, and at Sital-Chaj Air Base, where they
confiscated the entire Su-25 Frogfoot regiment.[17] Much to the dismay of Air Defense commanders, Azeri
forces had been seizing assets of the Air Defense Forces in Nakhichivan and
along the Azeri-Iranian border since the beginning of the year, depriving the
unified command of CIS Air Defense Forces of an important early-warning
capability in the airspace from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. In late May the OTH
ballistic missile early-warning radar site at Liaki was visited by members of
the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet who threatened to close the station due to
environmental and public safety concerns. General Grachev, the Russian
Minister of Defense, claimed that the 104th Airborne Division would be moved to
Saratov, Russia, beginning in June, with the entire transfer of men and
equipment to be complete by the end of 1993.[18] In early August 1992, Russian forces agreed to turn over
military installations and hardware from the 75th and 60th MRD, signaling an
end to an official Russian military presence in Azerbaijan. In accordance with
the agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, the
Caspian Sea Flotilla was divided into four equal parts. Azerbaijan officially
celebrated the creation of the Azerbaijan Navy on July 26 and appointed Captain
First Rank R. Askerovii as its first commander.[19]
PROBLEMS FACING THE AZERBAIJANI MILITARY
As was often the case with the majority of conscripts from the Turkic-speaking
southern republics of the Soviet Union, most Azerbaijani draftees were assigned
to low-ranking, non-technical positions within the Soviet Army. In 1991, for
example, there were only 3,420 officers and 6,672 non-commissioned officers of
Azerbaijani origin serving in the entire Soviet Army of four million-plus
men.[20] Currently, only nine active-duty
Azerbaijanis have served in the Soviet Army in the posts of deputy regimental
commanders (Lieutenant Colonel) or higher. Before the transfer of military
units and equipment this past July and August, some 90 percent of the enlisted
force in subunits (battalion or lower) were composed of native Azeris while 40
percent of the total military forces in Azerbaijan were non-Azeris; most of
the officer and technician positions were filled by Slavic soldiers and airmen.
In fact, even within the new Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, some 10 percent
of the staff are non-Azeris, mainly Russians and Ukrainians.[21] As a consequence, the greatest challenge facing the
Azerbaijani Defense Ministry is the creation of a strong officer and warrant
officer corps from among the ranks of the native population.
In the interim, the lack of a native Azerbaijani officer corps has led to a
great reliance on non-native officers, primarily Russians and Ukrainians who
decided to remain in Azerbaijan in response to generous salary and benefit
packages offered by the Azerbaijani government, and partly due to bleak
employment prospects within the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. Azerbaijan
has been forced to hire Slavic mercenaries to fly combat missions over
Nagorno-Karabakh in support of Azeri ground forces, with payments given for
each successful sortie. In order to increase the size and quality of the
officer corps, Azerbaijan has signed several military training agreements with
the Turkish government. Since June, for example, Azerbaijan has sent several
dozen officers to be trained in Turkey while several retired Turkish
generals
have arrived in Azerbaijan to assist in combat training. Azerbaijan has also
made arrangements to have Azerbaijani officers sent to Russia for
military-technical training.
While the transfer of CIS military equipment gave an initial boost to the
Azerbaijan military, the defense responsibilities left in the wake of
retreating CIS forces threaten to overwhelm the capabilities of the fledgling
defense ministry. The dismemberment of the complex air defense structure along
the Azeri-Iranian border, coupled with the lack of technical personnel trained
to operate the radar system, has exposed Azerbaijan's southern border and
allowed Iranian jets to violate the Azerbaijani border with impunity during
August and September 1992. With the removal of CIS border guards in September,
Azerbaijan will be forced to allocate scarce personnel and material resources
to patrolling the porous border with Iran. In the north along the border with
the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan is confronted with Lezghian separatists who
are agitating to secede from Azerbaijan and reunite with their ethnic kin in
southern Russian Daghestan. The situation along the Azeri-Daghestani border
has been exacerbated by the resettlement of Nagorno-Karabakh refugees into
Lezghian-populated northern Azerbaijan and the forced induction of Lezghians
into the Azerbaijani military for combat in Nagorno-Karabakh.[22] Divisions exist even within the ethnic community of the
Azeri Turks, with the country being split along regional lines between Azeri
Turks in the isolated enclave of Nakhichivan and Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan
proper.[23] The 75th MRD was transferred to
representatives of the Nakhichivan government rather than authorities from the
Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense. In short, Azerbaijan has neither the manpower
nor the material resources to simultaneously guard the southern borders, quell
potential ethnic conflict in the north, rein in rebellious Turks in
Nakhichivan, and continue military operations against Armenia in the west. The
security planners will have to adjust their priorities or put Azerbaijan at
risk of being pulled apart by the same centrifugal forces of ethnic and
regional separatism that destroyed the Soviet Union.
While the military stores left by the retreating CIS forces have provided
Azerbaijan with sufficient military equipment for the immediate future, the
lack of an armaments industry will force Azerbaijan to seek munitions and
replacement parts for damaged military equipment from other CIS countries, most
notably Ukraine and Russia, where the majority of the former Soviet defense
industry was located.[24] To finance both
armament purchases and military operations, Azerbaijan has allocated
approximately 2.8 billion rubles or 12 percent of the gross domestic product
for the defense budget, the third largest sector of the state budget behind
education and pensions.[25] Though the
economic position of Azerbaijan vis-a-vis Armenia is relatively strong, a
burgeoning defense budget is consuming funds desperately needed to upgrade the
Azeri oil industry and address the disastrous environmental problems associated
with Azerbaijan's extractive industries.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, though initially escalating the level of violence, the transfer of
CIS armaments to Azerbaijan and Armenia and the removal of CIS troops from
Azerbaijan have a greater potential of peacefully resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict then any attempt at outside mediation. Firstly, the
removal of CIS forces "clarifies" the battlelines and undermines the practice
adopted by both Armenia and Azerbaijan of blaming Russia and CIS forces for
their respective military setbacks. This new situation also allows Russia and
CIS member-states to legitimately become impartial observers and mediators, a
status which was impossible to achieve as long as their troops remained
actively engaged in the middle of the conflict. The transfer of equipment has
also shattered hopes harbored by many Azerbaijanis that the military situation
would shift to Azerbaijan's advantage once they nationalized the equipment of
the former Soviet army; this advantage failed to transpire mainly because the
transfer of military equipment to both Azerbaijan and Armenia was roughly equal
or, in cases where a disequilibrium occurred, one side was given weapons
(e.g. Armenian SAMs) to counter the advantage of the other side
(e.g. Azerbaijan's warplanes). Moreover, the mountainous terrain in the
areas of conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Azeri-Armenian border
precluded the effective use of large scale military assaults by armored forces,
while the lack of skilled pilots and operational aircraft has largely mitigated
the impact of airpower. Consequently, although the Azerbaijanis achieved
several important military victories following the transfer of two divisions in
June, neither the Azerbaijanis nor the Armenians gained a strategic advantage.
The result has been a protracted stalemate along the frontlines throughout the
summer.
The transfer of CIS weapons to Azerbaijan and the popular election of the APF
allowed Azerbaijan to recapture areas lost to Armenia during the spring.
Though these events failed to translate into the desired strategic victory,
they have strengthened Azerbaijan's negotiating position and increased the
popular support for the Azerbaijani government. It would have been impossible
for the Azeri side to negotiate a comprehensive settlement in the wake of the
disastrous defeats during the spring. A stronger position on the battlefield
has allowed Azerbaijan to feel confident enough to pursue a negotiated
settlement with Armenia.
The removal of CIS forces and the assumption of a weighty defense burden once
shouldered by CIS forces has apparently dampened the enthusiasm of APF leaders
to seek a military solution in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is highly
unlikely that the undermanned and undertrained Azeri army can continue military
operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, protect the Azeri-Iranian border, patrol the
Caspian Sea, maintain order along the Azeri-Daghestani border, and reign in the
independence-minded leaders in Nakhichivan who have been isolated from
Azerbaijan proper by the war with Armenia. Given these new-found security
responsibilities, it is probable that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh could
assume a lower priority than maintaining the existing integrity of Azerbaijan.
Top *Non-Commissioned Officer in
the U.S. Air Force.[1]
The Military Balance, 1991-1992 (Oxford: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 34.
[2]Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 August 1992,
pp. 1-2.
[3]Lee Feinstein, "Commonwealth Members Offer
Early Support for CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, January/February
1992, p. 44.
[4]Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 8, 1992, pp.
1, 3.
[5]The Military Balance, 1991-1992, p.
44.
[6]"MVD at 'Trouble Spots'," Jane's Defense
Weekly, 18 November 1989, p. 1113.
[7]Soviet Military Power 1990
(Washington: US GPO, 1990), map supplement.
[8]The Military Balance, 1991-1992, p.
38. Military Technology, January 1992, p. 151. Soviet Military
Power, op. cit.
[9]Krasnaia zvezda, May 28, 1991, p.
1.
[10]In February 1992, for example, almost 17
percent of all officers and 90 percent of all enlisted personnel serving in
Azerbaijan were Azeri nationals. Moscow Interfax in English, 26 February 1992,
transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hence FBIS), Soviet
Union Daily Report, 92-039, 27 February 1992; Krasnaia zvezda, 4
June 1992, p. 2.
[11]Komsomolskaia Pravda, 18 September
1991, p. 2-3.
[12]Conversely, the 366th Motorized Rifle
Regiment, a subunit of the 23rd MRD stationed in Stepanakert NKAO, was
predominantly (over 50 percent) staffed by local Armenians and often found
itself supporting Armenian forces in attacks against Azeri-populated
strongholds.
[13]Krasnaia zvezda, 4 June 1992, p.
2.
[14]Moscow TASS International Service, 16
January 1992, transcribed in FBIS, Soviet Union Daily Report, 92-012, 17
January 1992, p. 20.
[15]Krasnaia zvezda, 11 April 1992, pp.
3, 5.
[16]In late February, President Yeltsin sent
General Gromov and Admiral Chernavin to negotiate the transfer of some military
units to Azerbaijan. In accordance with the agreement reached between the two
parties, Azerbaijan received a helicopter squadron, the Baku Combined Arms
Command School, and a large part of the rear service (supply) units of the
Fourth Army; see Izvestiia, 24 February 1992, p. 1.
[17]Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 August
1992, pp. 1-2.
[18]Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 June 1992,
p. 2.
[19]Bakinskii rabochii, 7 August 1992,
p. 3.
[20]Dmitry Trenin and Vadim Makarenko, "What
Can the Army Do When There is Fighting All Around?" New Times, June
1992, pp. 8-9.
[21]Krasnaia zvezda, 4 June 1992, p.
2.
[22]Nezavisimaia gazeta, 15 September
1992, p. 3.
[23]In fact, the Autonomous Republic of
Nakhichivan, not the central authorities in Baku, were the recipients of
military equipment and stores left by the 75th MRD. Security affairs are the
responsibility of the Nakhichivan parliament and not subordinate to the Azeri
Ministry of Defense. Tehran IRNA, 9 January 1992, as transcribed in FBIS,
Soviet Union Daily Report, 92-007, 10 January 1992, p. 53.
[24]Under the former-Soviet
military-industrial structure, Azerbaijan mainly produced textiles and
radio-electronic equipment for the Soviet military.
[25]Economic Review: Azerbaijan
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1992), p. 87.
Copyright © 1993-2001 by Patrick Gorman and Central Asia Monitor. All rights
reserved.
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