ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EVENTS DEVOTED TO UNDERSTANDING ISSUES OF STATE-BUILDING AND NATION-BUILDING IN THE POSTCOMMUNIST STATES A quarterly publication of the Association for the Study of Nationalities Published in association with the Slavic & East European Studies Program of Baylor University Volume 13, No. 1 - February 2001 *This article appeared in the February 2001 issue of the ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EVENTS Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis and the Search for Identity Elin Suleymanov, Embassy of Azerbaijan (Washington, DC) Defining identity is one of the major challenges facing societies in the former Soviet Republics. In reality this challenge extends beyond any specific region of the world, as identity transformations take place in every social system. It is the pace and extent of change nature that make post-Soviet societies so uniquely well - suited for analysis. Contrary to widespread initial assumptions, rediscovering earlier, pre-Soviet identities has not been as helpful as it was hoped. In some cases, it has caused additional problems rather than solved existing ones. After all, identity is a developing phenomenon and direct extrapolation of a fixed form of it from years ago is unlikely to work well. Background and foreground. The Caucasus - with its historical location at the frontiers of diverse civilizations and its multiple layers of identity - is a region where simple definitions are often not applicable. This is especially true for the Republic of Azerbaijan, a country of so many transitions and socio - cultural crossroads that the easiest way to describe it is often through these transitions. Azerbaijanis often refer to their country as a bridge of different cultural and geographic regions. Once I heard a sobering comment from someone asking: "What good has ever happened on a bridge?" Yet, "bridge" is a helpful metaphor for a place where Europe meets Asia, where the Turkic world meets Iran and the Caucasus, and different Islamic groups meet different Christian and Jewish ones. This metaphor is helpful because the people of Azerbaijan, as they are transcending elements of their Soviet identity, do not see themselves in isolation from their neighbors and the region they live in. Such a perception of being a unique and yet an integral part of the immediate and wider region finds its political reflection in Azerbaijan's close relations with Georgia and the countries of Central Asia, as well as in her leadership in regional multilateral projects such as Silk Road transport network, the GUUAM bloc, among others. Not every aspect of identity in Azerbaijan and other parts of the region is immediately evident. Many things here are subtle and therefore sometimes missed by observers. Other things seem too confusing, as they don't fit preconceptions. Thus, tragic elements of the war with Armenia have often been missed because presumptions dictated otherwise. Ancient Azerbaijani culture's inclusiveness of diverse traditions, often contradictory ones, as well as the society's diversity and readiness for independence have been overlooked, because they are elements of the country's everyday life and not there "on display." Because Azerbaijan is a country of diverse cultures, and of varied ethnic and religious composition, identity is inclusive and flexible. This inclusive and flexible nature makes identity in Azerbaijan open for transitions and influences, and yet does not alter its core. Such a pattern is not unexpected in the Caucasus, known for its diverse traditions. The flexibility of elements of Azerbaijani identity reflects the dynamism of the society, which is different from the ones with dangerously fixed identities, that is, those based narrowly either on ethnicity or religion. Processes leading to restoration and strengthening of independence have often been complicated and have had a serious impact on shaping identity in the Republic of Azerbaijan. New Azerbaijan's birth was witnessed and described by American writer Thomas Goltz in his Azerbaijan Diary, a painfully vivid account of the Republic's first years of independence. As the country reasserts its identity, it is a search for its every citizen as well. For this defines not only Azerbaijan but also what it means to be Azerbaijani. Trying to understand own identity is not a new phenomenon for Azerbaijan. Kurban Said, in his novel Ali and Nino, brilliantly described choices people had to make in early twentieth century Azerbaijan. And some of those choices were rather dramatic: Father leaves because he doesn't like "this new country," and son stays and dies fighting because his "new Azerbaijan needs him." Turning from Iran to Turkey in search for allies and friends was a break with the past and a reflection of a more general worldwide emphasis on national, rather than religious identity. Ali and Nino, a love story about an Azerbaijani and a Georgian, provides a personal and an emotional account of those events. But what are the most important factors shaping modern Azerbaijan's identity, and as a result political developments and policy choices? Important influences include memories of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918-1920, the Turkish Republic, the Caucasus environment, the two Azerbaijans, the war with Armenia, Black January of 1990, nationalist mobilization and political instability, the culture of suffering and the refugee population, and the Caspian energy assets and associated Western interest and influence. Understanding these influences is a precondition to understanding how Azerbaijanis see themselves, make sense of events, and respond to opportunities. The ADR and Turkey. For the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) of 1918-1920, an orientation towards Turkey and the West played a critical role in its development, which was interrupted by the Bolshevik aggression of April 1920. Pro-Western "Turkism" dominated thinking of the ADR founders, who had to leave their country following Azerbaijan's return to Russia's control. The same thinking dominated the main political groups opposed to the Soviet authorities in the last years of the USSR, when such sentiments could again be openly expressed. While possibly an effective rallying point, a simple return to the ideology of ADR meant in many ways a nostalgic step back to thinking which remained almost frozen in its 1920s state. This is a widespread problem many societies face in their transitions as they attempt to reject effects of decades of either colonial and/or ideological domination. The easy option of rejecting anything related to the time of domination makes the "frozen past" a basis for nation - building. However, as the Azerbaijani state has matured since 1991, so has the recognition that realities in the world, while resembling those in 1920s, have also changed significantly. For instance, Azerbaijan's relations with Turkey are increasingly those of two fraternal states and close partners promoting regional cooperation which based on common interests and shared responsibility for the region, rather than ideology. Turkey, as an example of a successful, pro-western, secular state with culture similar to that of Azerbaijan, in many ways provides a useful model and source of inspiration. The Caucasus. Close ties with Georgia and the wars in Chechnya have heightened Azerbaijanis' awareness of their Caucasian identity. Distinctly Caucasus elements became more visible in Azerbaijani culture. Symbolically, a central street in Baku, previously named after a Soviet revolutionary leader, now carries the name of the legendary nineteenth century Caucasian warrior, Sheikh Shamil. Furthermore, the Chechen wars contributed to an already increasing awareness of Islam in Azerbaijan. Significantly, most of this awareness came as a result of solidarity with suffering civilians in Chechnya and, to a lesser degree with Muslim victims of conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, rather than through the influence of Iran. The country's independence also provided favorable conditions for Azerbaijan's diverse non-Muslim groups to re-discover their own spiritual heritage after years of Soviet policies aimed at discouraging such developments. The two Azerbaijans. In late 1989, Azerbaijani protesters tore down the fences on the USSR's border with Iran along the river Araz (Araxes), and for the first time in many decades relatives from both sides could meet each other. This very emotional moment brought people of northern (then Soviet) and southern (Iranian) parts of historic Azerbaijan together. In one of its first issues, the then newly established Moscow newspaper Kommersant called the fences along the Araz "another Berlin Wall." Azerbaijanis have always felt strongly about division of Azerbaijani lands between Russia and Iran in 1828. However joyful the family reunions were, soon it became very clear that, in spite of the same language, culture and traditions, long years of separation led the identities in the North and the South to develop differently. In fact, some factors influencing modern identity worldwide were not even present when the border was established along the Araz. While identity of the South's population developed broadly within the Iranian, and subsequently Middle Eastern, framework, population of the Republic of Azerbaijan clearly sees itself as a part of the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, areas with which it shares common elements of historical experience and culture. Political processes taking place in the Republic of Azerbaijan have also been similar to those in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, and hence very different from the ones in Iran and in the Middle East in general. This has resulted in different political thinking and priorities. It was the loosening of the border regime between Azerbaijan and Iran that helped people on both sides of the Araz to learn more about each other. Contacts between the North and the South significantly expanded cultural exchanges, social interaction and cross-border trade. But in some ways, especially recently, they also contributed to a strengthening modern Azerbaijani identity within the framework of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Of course, the plight of our brethren in the Iran continues and will continue to be among major concerns for Azerbaijanis in the North. In addition to being deprived of adequate political representation, Azeris in Iran are not free to express their identity, or to develop their own educational institutions and mass media outlets using the Azeri language. The war with Armenia. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has been the most visible and, perhaps, critical factor affecting Azerbaijani political life and identity since 1988. One hears much about "centuries-old hatred" behind that conflict. For most Azerbaijanis, despite some violent incidents in history - no more frequent than many other neighboring groups have had with each other - the 1988 confrontation came as a surprise. No less surprising was that the Armenian side was much better prepared for the war. Confrontation with Armenia dramatically accelerated the social and political mobilization of Azerbaijani society. The rapid escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war led many in Azerbaijan to see external forces behind it. And there has been plenty of evidence to support that, from the open participation of the Russian military in the Khojaly massacre to the strong indications that Soviet special services were involved in stirring up violence in general. The massacre of civilians in the town of Khojaly by joint Armenian and Russian forces came as a terrifying reminder that newly independent Azerbaijan was at war. It showed the aggressive nature of Armenian expansionism and reasserted suspicions that at least some in newly-independent Russia still harbor hostility against Azerbaijan. The conflict has been widely perceived in Azerbaijan as a political, rather than an ethnic, one. An inter-state conflict leading, with some external backing, to Armenia's occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan's territory, this war was also seen as following the traditional imperial divide and rule policy to prevent the independent development of Azerbaijan and the region as a whole. People in Azerbaijan view ethnic cleansing of the occupied territories of the non-Armenian population as an aggression against their country and against the principles upon which it is being built, rather than merely one ethnic group versus another. This, too, contributed to a strengthening population's solidarity with its new state. Black January. Initial resentment towards Moscow's support for Armenia contributed significantly to the spread of pro-independence sentiments in Azerbaijan. In 1988, Azerbaijan became one of the first Soviet Republics to adopt the declaration of sovereignty. The por-independence movements grew out of the weakness of the Moscow-backed authorities, and in fact already in 1988 it was Soviet, mainly Russian, military that enforced curfew and clashed with protesters in Baku. After Black January of 1990, when Soviet troops stormed Baku and killed scores of civilians, independence from the former Soviet Union became the only option in the eyes of the majority of Azerbaijanis. The tragedy of January of 1990 carried many elements of symbolism. The funeral procession for the victims was attended by hundreds of thousands people in spite of the curfew and the military regime. Moreover, it was led by Azerbaijan's Christian, Jewish and Muslim clergy. The list of victims of the military action, which Kremlin characteristically described as "fighting Islamic fundamentalism" included members from Azerbaijan's diverse communities, among them Russians, Jews, Tatars and others. This was yet another, albeit more tragic, reflection of multicultural character of Azerbaijan's society. January 20 was a turning point for Azerbaijan. Brutality of that attack, ordered personally by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and the introduction of total military control immediately afterwards, eliminated any second thoughts about Azerbaijan remaining within the former Soviet Union. Black January made the aspiration for independence from Moscow, rather than confrontation with Armenia, the main mobilizing factor in Azerbaijani politics and identity. In addition, Black January prompted realization of the need for independence, reflective of a certain evolution that took place in Azerbaijan in late 1980s and early 1990s. This realization also was also based upon a long-present and yet subtle understanding that Azerbaijan was a distinct country, under Moscow's occupation. Both Moscow and Azerbaijani authorities grossly underestimated pro-independence feelings in Azerbaijani society. Therefore, the speed with which those sentiments became dominant was a surprise to the Kremlin, to the authorities in Baku (who had long before lost touch with the population) and, arguably, also for the West and for many of the Azerbaijani elite. This was due partly to the controls, including outright military curfew, imposed on Azerbaijan. These both prevented open manifestations of pro-independence sentiments and intensified these sentiments by turning the overwhelming Soviet military presence in the streets into a visible indication of what was perceived to be a colonial policy. The military omnipresence in the country was one important reason why in 1993, soon after independence, Azerbaijan became the first former Soviet republic with no foreign troops on its soil. Imposition of a curfew at the time when the rest of the former Soviet Union was undergoing democratic transformation significantly affected Azerbaijan's political landscape. Even though pressure from the pathetically weak and military-backed government failed to prevent the rise of political opposition, it played a role in deforming the country's development. This pressure served as a political filter sorting out open discussions, various public sector initiatives and other elements of civil society, while at the same time allowing for and indirectly encouraging growth of the most politically motivated forces. As a result, by 1991, Azerbaijan's political spectrum acquired its confrontational "government versus opposition" pattern, with other social institutions still underdeveloped. Azerbaijani society's ability to move ahead, despite being one of the few places in the former Soviet Union with direct imposition of military control, shows the strength of the national movement in Azerbaijan. Yet, the impact of skewed socio-political development under the curfew is still felt in the country. Nationalist mobilization and political instability. Public outrage after Hojaly led to replacement of the questionably - legitimate authorities by a questionably - legitimate ramp parliament of equal number of opposition and pro-government members. The authorities paid for their policy of preventing the growth of civil society and allowing for no channels to express discontent other than street protests. In addition, the population saw the government, long-backed by Russia, as facilitating Azerbaijan's losses and as unsuitable for an independent country. The subsequent rise to power of the Popular Front government indicated the public's idealistic thinking, not unusual for early years of independence. As the euphoria of the first year of formal independence faded and losses in the war mounted, the new government's political inexperience and radicalism became clear. In terms of political thinking, the population matured more than the political forces in the country, something that may still be true today. Opting for more pragmatic and experienced leadership soon afterwards has been one indication of this maturity. The culture of suffering and the refugee population. Another impact of the conflict with Armenia, and the tragedy of Khojaly in particular, has been appearance of a culture of suffering among Azerbaijanis. This was fueled by the aggression and ethnic cleansing committed against Azerbaijanis, and the lack of an adequate international response. Then, there is also Armenia, which used its own culture of suffering for ethnic consolidation, soliciting international sympathy and justification of its own aggressive policies. In Azerbaijan, the culture of suffering is nowhere as strong as in Armenia, nor is it the main mobilizing factor in the society. Still, the Alley of Martyrs on Baku's hilltop, other memorials to the victims of the war, horrors of Khojaly, the continuous occupation, and the huge population displaced from Armenia and from Armenian -occupied regions of Azerbaijan, all contribute to making recent suffering a powerful and sad aspect of Azerbaijan's identity. In this respect Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans American direct assistance to Azerbaijan and was enacted by U.S. Congress in 1992, adds an insult to injury. The presence of numerous refugee and internally displaced communities exiled either just before the country's independence or shortly afterwards is an important reality. This factor's impact is complicated by its temporary nature. With the displaced persons provided with care where they are and at the same time expected to return home soon, Azerbaijanis have yet to acknowledge the challenges of dealing with the massive displacement. Large numbers of socially disadvantaged displaced persons have further widened the socio-economic gap between Baku and the rest of the country - already amplified by oil-related economic growth in the capital. Energy Assets and Westen Interest and Influence. Just as in 1920s, the development of Caspian oil resources has played a significant role for Azerbaijan since independence. Oil reserves allowed the country some confidence and provided the economic basis for its statehood. Azerbaijan's leading role in opening the region to the world raised the country's international profile and reestablished Baku as the center and gateway of the Caspian region. Energy-related developments brought a direct Western presence and influence into Azerbaijan. This helped to overcome the Soviet mentality by transforming social and economic practices, particularly by introducing a new business culture. Conclusion. A place of many influences and diverse traditions, Azerbaijan has been able to embrace change in its first decade of independence. Despite all the difficulties, Azerbaijanis have not become either a bitter people or a past-oriented people. The search to understand one's identity does not end on one fixed point, so, hopefully, the people of Azerbaijan will continue theirs in the traditionally forward-looking and flexible manner. Azerbaijan's complex identity will continue to evolve based on how the past and its consequences are reinterpreted to deal with the present. For those who are nine years old or younger this year, being born in their own independent country is no longer a dream, but a fact of life. Note: The views expressed are those of the author only, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Embassy of Azerbaijan Elin Suleymanov is Press Officer at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington, DC. He completed his undergraduate work in political geography at Moscow State University, and holds an MPA degree from the University of Toledo in Ohio. Before joining the Embassy he worked at OMRI in Prague and the UNHCR in Baku. His articles have appeared in the Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union and in Azerbaijan International.